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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this diversity action we are called upon to 
interpret the meaning of insurance policy language that a state 
statute requires to be included in all Pennsylvania insurance 
contracts.  Plaintiff-appellant Mark Hofkin contends that 
language in the "Proofs of Loss" and "Legal Actions" clauses in 
his accident and sickness insurance policy require only that he 
submit adequate proofs of loss within ninety days after the 
termination of a continuous period of disability.  Defendant-
appellee Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company 
("Provident") argues that it properly denied Hofkin's claims 
because the policy language, considered as a whole, requires the 
insured to submit monthly proofs of loss in order to be eligible 
to receive disability benefits. 
 Provident filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 50 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on statute of limitations 
grounds.  The district court, citing policy considerations that 
underlie suit limitations provisions, granted Provident's motion 
to dismiss.  In so doing, the district court declined to follow 
the majority of state and federal courts that have interpreted 
identical policy language to require only that a claimant submit 
adequate proofs of loss within ninety days after an uninterrupted 
aggregate period of disability covered by the policy.
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 The language contained in the Provident policy is 
essentially a verbatim recitation of the terms of the 
Pennsylvania statute we must interpret.  The Pennsylvania courts 
have not addressed the issue as to when proofs of loss are 
required to be filed in cases involving a continuous period of 
disability.  We predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
elect to follow the majority of courts that have interpreted the 
phrase "period for which the insurer is liable" to require the 
insured to submit proofs of loss within ninety days after the 
termination of a continuous period of disability, rather than on 
a monthly basis during the entire period of disability.    
 Under our interpretation of the policy language, an 
issue of fact remains as to whether Hofkin was totally disabled 
for the continuous period of time that he has alleged.  As such, 
the order of the district court 
granting Provident's Rule 50 motion to dismiss will be reversed 
and the matter remanded for further proceedings.  As to the other 
issues raised on this appeal, we will affirm the district court's 
rejection of Hofkin's argument that his claims were denied in bad 
faith.  The district court's denial of Hofkin's application to 
amend his complaint will also be affirmed. 
 
I. 
 Mark Hofkin was insured by Provident under an accident 
and sickness policy that took effect in July of 1980.  At that 
time, Hofkin was the sole proprietor of a heating and air 
conditioning installation company.  On March 13, 1986, Hofkin was 
4 
involved in an automobile accident in which he injured his neck, 
back, left wrist and elbow.  Hofkin contends that he has never 
recovered fully from the injuries he sustained in this accident. 
 On September 13, 1986, Hofkin had his attorney submit 
to Provident a supplementary statement of claim form.  On this 
form, Hofkin indicated that he had been totally disabled0 from 
March 13, 1986 through June 16, 1986.  Hofkin also contended that 
he was partially disabled from June 17 up until the time he 
submitted his claim form in September.  On September 16, 1986, 
Provident paid Hofkin $5,760.00 for the time he was totally 
disabled in the months immediately following the accident.  In 
addition to the cash payment, Provident also sent Hofkin a claim 
form that he was required to complete in order to be eligible to 
receive residual disability benefits.0 
                                                           
0
  The Provident policy provides the following definition of 
"total disability": 
 
(a)  Until the date you attain age 55, or 
until the date indemnity for total disability 
has been paid during a period of disability 
under this policy for five years, whichever 
is later, 'Total Disability' means your 
inability to perform the substantial and 
material duties of your occupation. 
 
App. at 21. 
0
  The policy defines "residual disability" in the following 
manner: 
 
(a)  your inability to perform one or more of 
your important daily business duties, or 
 
(b)  your inability to perform your usual 
daily business duties for as much time as is 
usually required for the performance of such 
duties. 
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 On January 19, 1987, Hofkin submitted an application 
for residual disability benefits, alleging that he had been 
unable to work full time since June of 1986.  Hofkin failed, 
however, to include necessary details as to the amount of income 
he had lost as a consequence of the March 1986 accident.  In a 
letter dated January 23, 1987, a Provident claims representative 
responded by sending Hofkin a letter requesting the additional 
information he would be required to provide in order to be 
eligible to receive any residual disability benefits. 
 In March of 1987, Hofkin submitted a statement of claim 
for residual disability benefits, a supplementary statement of 
claim, an accountant's report and a 1985 tax return.  Again, 
specific financial information as to Hofkin's alleged loss of 
income, which was required to calculate residual disability 
benefits, was omitted.  Within a week, a Provident representative 
contacted Hofkin's attorney and reiterated the insurer's need for 
more complete information.  Hofkin responded on April 29, 1987, 
with a revised claim form for residual benefits, simply stating 
"None" where he was asked to indicate his present income.  On 
June 25, 1987, Provident sent yet another letter to Hofkin 
requesting further documentation of his alleged reduction of 
income and additional information regarding the extent to which 
his business activities had been curtailed. 
 On March 8, 1990, after almost a three-year gap in 
communication between Hofkin and Provident, Hofkin's counsel 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Id. at 16. 
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again wrote to Provident requesting additional claims forms. 
Although Provident supplied the forms, Hofkin never completed 
them.  Additional proofs of loss were sent to Provident only 
after the onset of litigation.  On March 12, 1993, June 17, 1993, 
June 30, 1993, March 7, 1994, and March 10, 1994, Hofkin provided 
supplementary proofs of loss in support of his claim for total 
disability benefits.   
 Hofkin's attorney filed a writ of summons in the Court 
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in January of 1993.  In 
March of 1993, this matter was removed to the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Hofkin asserted the 
following claims in his district court complaint:  (1) he is 
entitled to total disability benefits from June of 1986 until the 
present;  (2) in the alternative, he is entitled to residual 
disability benefits from June of 1986, until the present;  and 
(3) Provident has acted in "bad faith" under 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 8371 by refusing to pay Hofkin's claims and failing to 
inform him of his alleged eligibility for total disability 
benefits at a much earlier date.   Hofkin filed a motion for 
leave to file an amended complaint which was denied.  On December 
1, 1994, after a four day jury trial, the district court granted 
Provident's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis 
of the Legal Actions clause contained in the Provident policy. 
Hofkin then filed a motion to vacate the judgment as a matter of 
law, a motion for a new trial, and requested leave to file an 
amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.  By order dated 
7 
June 30, 1995, the district court denied Hofkin's postjudgment 
motions.  This appeal followed.   
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§1291.  An entry of judgment as a matter of law is subject to 
plenary review.  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 
1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993).  A Rule 50 motion should be granted 
"only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and 
reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a 
jury could reasonably find liability."  Id.  A Rule 50 motion 
must be denied "if there is evidence reasonably tending to 
support the recovery by plaintiff as to any of its theories of 
liability."  Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 849 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citation omitted).    
 This dispute is governed by Pennsylvania law.  The 
district court's application and interpretation of state law is 
subject to plenary review.  C.L. Grimes v. Vitalink 
Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1557 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 480 (1994).  As a state statute required the 
dispositive policy language, we must discern the intent of the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly, not the contracting parties.  As 
such, our review of the district court's interpretation of the 
Legal Actions clause is plenary.  See, e.g., Ogelsby v. Penn 
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 872, 886 n.9 (D. Del. 1995) 
("Since [the] policy provision is required by statutory mandate, 
8 
the Court looks to rules of statutory construction.");  Laidlaw 
v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, 255 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Minn. 
1977) ("The usual rule of construction most favorable to the 
insured does not apply to a provision required by statute."); cf. 
Margolies v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 810 F. Supp. 637, 640 
(E.D. Pa. 1992) (insurance company cannot contractually override 
the statutorily mandated suit limitation provisions of 
§753(A)(11)).0 
 We review the district court's denial of Hofkin's 
motion for leave to file an amended complaint for an abuse of 
discretion.  See Gay v. Petsock, 917 F.2d 768, 772 (3d Cir. 
1990).  A district court abuses its discretion when its "decision 
rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact." 
International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. and 
Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 
95 (3d Cir. 1987), appeal on remand, 917 F.2d 107, cert. denied, 
499 U.S. 921, 111 S. Ct. 1313 (1991). Under Pennsylvania law, an 
insurer's "bad faith must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence and not merely insinuated."  Terletsky v. Prudential 
                                                           
0
  This is not to say that Pennsylvania's rule of contra 
proferentum in construing policy language drafted by the insurer 
is necessarily inapplicable when evaluating the language of 
specific policy provisions required by statute.  Section 753(A) 
expressly permits an insurer to "substitute for one or more such 
provisions corresponding provisions of different wording approved 
by the commissioner which are in each instance not less favorable 
in any respect to the insured or the beneficiary."  Under this 
analysis, if the insurer chose to modify the required language, 
any modifications that are ambiguous should be construed in the 
insured's favor.  The language that we must interpret in the 
instant case is strictly provided by statute. 
9 
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 680, 688 (Pa. Super. 1994), 
alloc. denied, 659 A.2d 560 (Pa. 1995).  Our review of the 
dismissal of Hofkin's bad faith claim as a matter of law is 
plenary.  Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 747, 
750 (3d Cir. 1994).    
 
III. 
A. 
 The disposition of this case rests upon our 
interpretation of the Provident policy's "Legal Actions" clause 
and "Proofs of Loss" clause.  The Provident policy language 
mirrors that of the controlling statutory language: 
§ 753.  Policy Provisions 
 
 (A) Required Provisions.  Except as 
provided in paragraph (C) of this section, 
each such policy delivered or issued for 
delivery to any person in this Commonwealth 
shall contain the provisions specified in 
this subsection in the words in which the 
same appear in this section:  Provided, 
however, That the insurer may, at its option, 
substitute for one or more of such provisions 
corresponding provisions of different wording 
approved by the commissioner which are in 
each instance not less favorable in any 
respect to the insured or the beneficiary. . 
. .  
 
   . . .  
 
(7) . . .  
 
 Proofs of Loss:  Written proof of loss 
must be furnished to the insurer at its said 
office in case of claim for loss for which 
this policy provides any periodic payment 
contingent upon continuing loss within ninety 
days after the termination of the period for 
which the insurer is liable and in case of 
10 
claim for any other loss within ninety days 
after the date of such loss.  Failure to 
furnish such proof within the time required 
shall not invalidate nor reduce any claim if 
it was not reasonably possible to give proof 
within such time, provided such proof is 
furnished as soon as reasonably possible and 
in no event, except the absence of legal 
capacity, later than one year from the time 
proof is otherwise required.               
  . . .  
 
(11) . . . 
  
 Legal Actions:  No action in law or in 
equity shall be brought to recover on this 
policy prior to the expiration of sixty days 
after written proof of loss has been 
furnished in accordance with the requirements 
of this policy.  No such action shall be 
brought after the expiration of three years 
after the time written proof of loss is 
required to be furnished. 
 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 753(A)(7), (11) (1992 & 1995 Supp.) 
(emphasis added).  The only difference between the Provident 
Proofs of Loss clause and the language of § 753(A)(7) is the 
substitution of the word "Company" for "insurer."  The language 
of the statutory Legal Actions section is identical to that 
contained in the Provident policy. 
 The district court looked to policy considerations to 
support its conclusion that Hofkin's construction of the Proofs 
of Loss and Legal Actions clauses was "unreasonable."  Looking to 
what it perceived to be the consequences of interpreting § 753 in 
the manner favored by Hofkin, the district court opined that 
 [e]ven in interpreting the policy in 
light most favorable to plaintiff, it would 
be unreasonable to interpret the clause as 
plaintiff suggests.  Under plaintiff's 
proposed interpretation of the three year 
suit limitation clause, there would be no 
11 
limitation during a policyholder's lifetime 
until after he reaches age of fifty-five, 
when the policyholder would no longer meet 
the contract definition of total disability 
because of his age.  Theoretically, a 
policyholder may sit on a claim for more than 
fifty years before he files suit.  Therefore, 
the policy of having a suit limitation 
clause, as mandated by the State of 
Pennsylvania legislature, to expedite 
litigation and to discourage the pursuit of 
stale claims in order to reduce prejudice 
toward the defense would be inconsistent with 
plaintiff's interpretation. 
 
Hofkin v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.93-
1044, 1995 WL 394118, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1995).   
 As a general observation, we do not disagree with the 
district court's assessment that statutes of limitations can and 
do serve beneficial purposes.  Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has stated recently that statutes of limitations "are vital 
to the welfare of society and are favored in the law.  They are 
found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence. 
They promote repose by giving security and stability to human 
affairs.  An important public policy lies at their foundation." 
Armco, Inc. v. Worker's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Mattern), 667 
A.2d 710, 716 n.12 (Pa. 1995) (citations omitted).  Although we 
agree with the district court that important policy 
considerations underlie suit limitation provisions, these 
statutes nonetheless must be enforced as written.  Therefore, the 
policy considerations upon which the district court premised its 
dismissal of Hofkin's suit should not have been addressed prior 
12 
to making an effort to interpret what the "plain meaning" of the 
relevant paragraphs of § 753.0    
 The interpretation of Pennsylvania statutes is governed 
by the state's Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 1501-1991 (1995 Supp.).  When interpreting statutory 
language, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is guided by the "plain 
meaning" rule of construction.  Commonwealth v. Stanley, 446 A.2d 
583, 587 (Pa. 1982) (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1903(a)).0 
"When the words of a statute are clear and free of ambiguity, the 
letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of 
pursuing its spirit."  1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(b) (1995 
Supp.).   
 Under Pennsylvania law, the policy considerations cited 
by the district court would have been relevant only if the court 
had found the language of the Proofs of Loss and Legal Actions 
                                                           
0
  Nor do all of the policy considerations involved here weigh in 
favor of Provident.  Although Provident contended at oral 
argument that the plain meaning of "period for which the Company 
is liable" obviously referred to monthly payment intervals, when 
confronted with the implications of its reading of the statute, 
Provident attempted to distance itself from the natural 
consequences of this reading, contending that, in actual 
practice, Provident would not make monthly demands for proofs of 
loss upon insurance claimants.     
0
  Section 1903(a) provides as follows: 
 
 Words and phrases shall be construed 
according to rules of grammar and according 
to their common and approved usage;  but 
technical words and phrases and such others 
as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate 
meaning or are defined in this part, shall be 
construed according to such peculiar and 
appropriate meaning or definition. 
 
1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1903(a) (1995 Supp.). 
13 
clauses is ambiguous.  See id. § 1921(c).  An insurance policy 
term is deemed to be "ambiguous if reasonable people, considering 
it in the context of the entire policy, could fairly ascribe 
different meanings to it. . . . A court, however, should not 
torture the language of the policy to create ambiguities." 
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brotech Corp., 857 F. Supp. 423, 427 
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (citations omitted), aff'd, 60 F.3d 813 (3d Cir. 
1995).  Statutory ambiguities are to be resolved with reference 
to § 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act.0  We conclude, 
however, that when the policy language is considered as a whole, 
the insurance policy terms mandated by § 753 are not ambiguous 
and thus are amenable to "plain meaning" analysis under § 1903(a) 
of the Statutory Construction Act.   
                                                           
0
  See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c) (1995 Supp.): 
 
(c) When the words of the statute are not 
explicit, the intention of the General 
Assembly may be ascertained by considering, 
among other matters: 
 
 (1)  The occasion and necessity for the 
statute. 
 (2)  The circumstances under which it 
was enacted. 
 (3)  The mischief to be remedied. 
 (4)  The object to be attained. 
 (5)  The former law, if any, including 
other statutes upon the same or similar 
subjects. 
 (6)  The consequences of a particular 
interpretation. 
 (7)  The contemporaneous legislative 
history. 
 (8)  Legislative and administrative 
interpretations of such statute. 
 
 
14 
 
B. 
 Both parties contend that the policy language is not 
ambiguous and warrants a decision in their favor.  Hofkin argues 
that since the Proofs of Loss section states that no proofs have 
to be submitted until "90 days after the termination of the 
period for which the Company is liable," there is a jury question 
as to whether Hofkin met the contractual definition of total 
disability on a continuous basis. 
 Provident, on the other hand, places emphasis upon the 
terms "periodic payment," "period" and "monthly" in the policy 
language.  Provident notes that the Proofs of Loss clause states 
that "for loss for which this policy provides any periodic 
payment contingent upon continuing loss," written proof of loss 
must be furnished "within 90 days after the termination of the 
period for which the company is liable."  Provident also refers 
to language contained in the policy's "Time of Payment of Claims" 
clause,0 which states, in relevant part, that "subject to due 
                                                           
0
  See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 753 (A)(8): 
 
 Time of Payment of Claims:  Indemnities 
payable under this policy for any loss other 
than loss for which this policy provides any 
periodic payment will be paid immediately 
upon receipt of due written proof of such 
loss.  Subject to due written proof of loss, 
all accrued indemnities for loss for which 
this policy provides periodic payment will be 
paid . . . . . . . . . . . . (insert period 
for payment which must not be less frequently 
than monthly) and any balance remaining 
unpaid upon termination of liability will be 
paid immediately upon receipt of due written 
proof. 
15 
written proof of loss, all accrued indemnities for loss for which 
this policy provides periodic payment will be paid monthly." 
Provident construes this language as meaning that the "periodic 
payment" interval is what determines the subsequently referenced 
"period for which the Company is liable."  Under this 
interpretation, the Legal Actions clause's three-year limitation 
period would begin to run after the expiration of the ninety-day 
period following the first month for which benefits are at issue. 
 Although Pennsylvania state courts have not ruled upon 
this question, a significant number of state and federal courts 
have addressed the issue as to how the same (or virtually 
indistinguishable) statutorily mandated insurance policy language 
should be construed.  A substantial majority of those courts have 
expressly rejected Provident's construction of the statute, 
holding that the most plausible reading of "period for which the 
Company is liable" requires that this phrase be interpreted to 
encompass the entire length of an ongoing period of disability.   
 The meaning of the phrase "period for which the Company 
is liable" was most recently discussed by the district court in 
Ogelsby v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 877 F. Supp. 872 (D. 
Del. 1994).  The Ogelsby court interpreted insurance policy 
language prescribed by Delaware law which was essentially 
identical to the policy language at issue here.  See 18 Del. C. 
§3311 ("Written proof of loss must be furnished to the company at 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Within the terms of this section, Provident elected to set the 
payment period on a monthly basis.   
16 
its said office in case of claim for loss for which this policy 
provides any periodic payment contingent upon continuing loss 
within ninety days after the termination of the period for which 
the company is liable. . . ."), quoted in Ogelsby, 877 F. Supp. 
at 885 n.7.  The Ogelsby court elected to follow the weight of 
authority in this area of the law, noting that "the 
interpretation that plaintiff advances has been characterized as 
the most natural interpretation."  Ogelsby, 877 F. Supp. at 886. 
 The one Pennsylvania diversity case that has expounded 
upon the same Pennsylvania statute that we must interpret has 
also favored Hofkin's interpretation of § 753.  In Liberto v. 
Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 323 F. Supp. 1274 (W.D. 
Pa. 1971), an action was brought to recover under an accident 
policy four years after the company had discontinued paying 
benefits.  Id. at 1275.  The insurer argued that the plaintiff's 
claim was time barred under § 753.  Expressly rejecting this 
argument, the district court held that the policy's Proofs of 
Loss and Legal Actions clauses, considered along with other 
language in the policy providing that "the insurer is liable to 
pay the totally and permanently disabled insured `so long as the 
insured lives'," id. at 1276, necessarily led to the conclusion 
that the three-year period in the Legal Actions clause had not 
yet run, and would not be triggered until the claimant was 
deceased.  By analogy, the continuing period of disability in the 
instant case could conceivably continue until Hofkin reached age 
fifty-five, the expiration date of the policy. 
17 
 In Wall v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co., 274 N.W.2d 
208 (N.D. 1979), the Supreme Court of North Dakota interpreted 
identical language from state-required Proofs of Loss and Legal 
Actions clauses.  Adopting the reasoning of the court below, the 
Wall court held that the  
"period for which the insurer is liable" 
phrase means the total period of liability in 
a continuous disability case and not a 
monthly period during which benefits accrue. 
Penn's own provision authorizing monthly 
benefits payments does not alter the specific 
wording of [the statute which provides] that 
proof of loss must be filed only after the 
insurer's liability terminates. 
 
Id. at 213-14.  The supreme court agreed with the lower court's 
determination "that Wall's claim against Penn. Life was based 
upon continuing disability, Penn. Life's period of disability had 
not terminated, proof of loss was not yet required to be 
furnished and the Statute of Limitations had not begun to run." 
Id. at 214.  See Goodwin v. National Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 135, 143-
44 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (same).   
 Similarly, interpreting Arkansas law, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has concluded that  
[a]ny theory that supplying of proof of loss 
was a condition precedent to liability under 
the policy tends to be dispelled by the 
following policy language:  "written proof of 
loss must be given . . . within 90 days after 
. . . the period for which the company is 
liable." . . . Thus the policy itself 
contemplates that proof of loss may be 
submitted after disability terminates;  and 
at least to some extent difficulty the 
insurer may have in investigating a 
disability that has already ended is part and 
parcel of the insurance agreement. 
 
18 
Clark v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 504, 507 (8th 
Cir. 1984). 
 The Supreme Court of Minnesota has also addressed this 
issue.  In Laidlaw v. Commercial Insurance Co. of Newark, 255 
N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 1977), the court held that an expansive 
interpretation of "period for which the Company is liable" was 
warranted by identical language contained in the Proofs of Loss 
and Legal Actions clauses, considered along with substantially 
similar language contained in a Time of Payment of Claims clause. 
The Laidlaw court found that Hofkin's interpretation of "period 
for which the Company is liable" was "the most natural 
interpretation of the phrase,"  id. at 811, and held that "`the 
period for which (Company) is liable' refers to the total 
continuous period of disability, be it short or long, and not 
individual four-week periods."  Id.  When a Laidlaw-type claim is 
presented, "the question becomes whether a genuine issue of 
material fact exists as to the existence and continuity of [the 
claimant's] total disability."  Ryan v. ITT Life Ins. Corp., 450 
N.W.2d 126, 129 (Minn. 1990). 
 A New York trial court has also addressed this specific 
issue and concluded that judgment as a matter of law was 
inappropriate.  In Turner v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident 
Ass'n, 160 N.Y.S.2d 883, 890 (Sup. Ct. Oneida Cty. 1957), aff'd, 
172 N.Y.S.2d 571 (App. Div. 1958), the New York supreme court, 
interpreting the phrase "period for which the Association is 
liable," noted that  
19 
plaintiff's affidavit detail[ed] at length 
his circumstances during the period in 
question and sets forth facts which, if 
believed, might establish that he has been 
continuously disabled . . . .  In these 
circumstances, an issue of fact is presented 
which cannot be disposed of on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
 Finally, in Continental Casualty Co. v. Freeman, 481 
S.W.2d 309 (Ky. 1972), the court interpreted identical language 
in the Legal Actions and Proofs of Loss clauses as meaning 
either (a) that one proof of loss will 
suffice for one continuous period of 
disability or (b) that each month of 
continuing loss must be covered by a proof of 
loss submitted within 90 days thereafter. 
Neither of these alternatives would appear to 
achieve an entirely satisfactory arrangement, 
but we see no room for any other possible 
construction of the sentence as it is worded. 
The most natural import of the expression 
'the period for which the company is liable' 
is the total continuous period, be it five 
days or five years 
 
Id. at 312.  Interpreting the statutory language in a manner that 
favored the insured, the Freeman court concluded that "the clause 
is not ambiguous and there is no reason not to construe it as 
meaning just what it says."  Id. at 311-12. 
 There is, however, some case authority in support of 
Provident's position as to how the policy language at issue 
should be interpreted.  In Nikaido v. Centennial Life Insurance 
Co., 42 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit, applying 
20 
California law, held that a "more reasonable reading of these 
provisions" supports the conclusion that "`the period for which 
the Company is liable' refers to each month of disability."  Id. 
at 560.   
 Similarly, in Goff v. Aetna Life and Casualty Co., 563 
P.2d 1073 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977), a state appellate court also 
interpreted "period for which the insurer is liable" in the 
manner that Provident urges us to adopt.  The state court 
concluded that  
[th]e phrase [period for which the insurer is 
liable] speaks of a 'period' and applies only 
in a case where 'any periodic payment' is due 
under the pollicy (sic).  Where, as here, 
payments are due monthly it seems inescapable 
that each month for which a payment is due is 
a 'period for which the insurer is liable.' 
  
Id. at 1077.   
 We expressly reject and depart from this reasoning and 
analysis.  We agree with the North Dakota Supreme Court's 
statement in Wall that the policy language "authorizing monthly 
benefits does not alter the specific wording of [the policy] that 
proof of loss must be filed only after the insurer's liability 
terminates."  Wall, 274 N.W.2d at 214.  Provident's reading of 
§753, by contrast, is far less straightforward.  To adopt 
Provident's "plain meaning" interpretation would require the 
adaptation of a strained analytical framework that imparts 
questionable significance to various discrete references in the 
statute.  See Bertera's Hopewell Foodland, Inc. v. Masters, 236 
A.2d 197, 204 (Pa. 1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 597, 88 S. 
21 
Ct. 1261 (1968) ("A statute cannot be dissected into individual 
words, each one being thrown onto the anvil of dialectics to be 
hammered into a meaning which has no association with the words 
from which it has violently been separated."), overruled on other 
grounds by Goodman v. Kennedy, 329 A.2d 224 (Pa. 1974).  The 
"plain meaning" that Provident asks us to adopt is not at all 
clear from the face of the statute.    
 If the Proofs of Loss clause had simply included the 
word "monthly" before "period for which the Company is liable" 
Provident's reading of the statute would obviously be correct. In 
order to obtain such a change, however, Provident would be 
required to obtain the approval of the Commissioner of Insurance. 
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 753(A).  We seriously doubt that 
such permission would be forthcoming.  Given our interpretation 
of the statute and the weight of authority interpreting 
essentially identical policy language, we refuse to interpolate 
by judicial fiat the term "monthly" before "period for which the 
Company is liable," when the Pennsylvania General Assembly 
declined to follow this course.       
IV. 
 The district court also based its decision that 
Hofkin's claim was timed barred on the alternative ground that 
even if Hofkin's reading of the statute were to be adopted, the 
fact that Hofkin gave timely notice of the March 1986 accident 
and that he 
last submitted [a] claim . . . on April 29, 
1987, the running of the three year time 
limit for filing suit under the Legal Actions 
22 
clause was triggered at that time because the 
submission, which also included submissions 
on behalf of plaintiff by his attorney and 
physicians, constituted sufficient proofs of 
loss. 
 
Hofkin, 1995 WL 394118, at *3.  The district court went on to say 
that  
 [r]egardless of when proof of loss was 
required to have been furnished under the 
Proofs of Loss clause to trigger the Legal 
Actions clause as interpreted by plaintiff or 
the court, plaintiff admits in his complaint 
that he gave timely notice of his accident 
and that he provided the defendant with all 
required proofs of loss.  Therefore, in 
having fulfilled his obligation to provide 
proofs of loss, he was under obligation 
mandated by statute to file suit within three 
years after the time proofs of loss were 
required to be furnished.  Clearly he did not 
do so, and that is why plaintiff is barred 
from proceeding in this case. 
 
Id. at *6.  We reject this reading of § 753(A)(11).  The Legal 
Actions clause provides, in relevant part, that "No action . . . 
shall be brought after the expiration of three years after the 
time written proof of loss is required to be furnished."  PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 753 (A)(11) (1992 & 1995 Supp.) (emphasis 
added).  Nothing in this language suggests that Hofkin should be 
penalized for at least attempting, however intermittently, to 
provide proofs of loss at an earlier time than is required by 
§753(A)(11).  We therefore conclude that a factual issue remains 
as to the period of time, if any, that Hofkin was continuously 
disabled in order to assess properly his eligibility for total 
disability or residual disability benefits. 
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V. 
 We must still dispose of two other issues Hofkin has 
raised on appeal;  i.e., Hofkin's bad faith claim and his 
argument that he was improperly denied the opportunity to amend 
his complaint.  We reject both of these claims. 
 
A. 
 Pursuant to 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8371 (1982 & 1995 
Supp.), an insurer can be held liable for punitive damages and 
other sanctions if it is found to have acted in bad faith toward 
the insured.0  Based on proofs of loss that Provident had 
received in 1986, Hofkin alleges that Provident was aware that he 
has been totally and continuously disabled since that time. Thus, 
the argument goes, by informing him that he may qualify for 
additional residual disability benefits but not telling him that 
he might qualify for additional total disability benefits, 
Provident had acted in bad faith.  As the district court noted, 
                                                           
0
  Section § 8371 provides as follows: 
 
 In an action arising under an insurance 
policy, if the court finds that the insurer 
has acted in bad faith towards the insured, 
the court may take all of the following 
actions: 
 (1)  Award interest on the amount of the 
claim from the date the claim was made by the 
insured in an amount equal to the prime rate 
of interest plus 3%. 
 (2)  Award punitive damages against the 
insurer. 
 (3)  Assess court costs and attorney 
fees against the insurer. 
 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8371. 
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however, § 8371 did not take effect until July 1, 1990.  Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Paper Mfg. Co., 753 F. Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Pa. 
1990).  Therefore, even if we were to assume arguendo that 
Provident acted in bad faith before that date, such conduct is 
not actionable under § 8371.  Lombardo v. State Farm Mut. Ins. 
Co., 800 F. Supp. 208, 213 (E.D. Pa. 1992).  Furthermore, Hofkin 
has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that 
Provident acted in bad faith after July 1, 1990.  The record is 
clear that Hofkin and the attorneys retained in his on-and-off 
pursuit of earlier benefits claims have been less than diligent 
in providing information that was necessary to evaluate Hofkin's 
various claims.  The record does not show that Provident engaged 
in any improper business practices.  At most, Provident appeared 
to hold Hofkin to its own regulations.  There was plainly no bad 
faith here. 
 
B.   
 Finally, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying Hofkin's motion for leave to file an 
amended complaint.  Hofkin filed the motion to amend on September 
22, 1994, seeking to include a claim for refund of premium. 
Hofkin concedes that his complaint did not specifically plead 
waiver of premium but argues that the "Wherefore" clause of the 
complaint, which stated that Hofkin was entitled to "any other 
relief this Honorable Court deems appropriate," was sufficient to 
apprise Provident of Hofkin's intention to seek a refund of 
premium in this case.  We disagree.  Given the late date of the 
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request and the prejudice it would impose upon Provident 
(requiring it to prepare new defenses), the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Hofkin's motion to amend his 
complaint. 
 
VI. 
 We hold that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt 
the majority approach and interpret "the period for which was 
Company is liable" language in the Proofs of Loss clause as 
referring to a continuous period of disability.  Under this 
analysis, it is still possible that the suit limitation provision 
in the Legal Actions clause has not yet been triggered. 
Therefore, the order of the district court granting Provident's 
Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law will be reversed 
and the matter remanded to the district court to conduct the 
necessary fact finding.  We will affirm the June 25, 1995 order 
of the district court insofar as it denied Hofkin's bad faith 
claim and his motion to amend his complaint.  Costs taxed against 
the appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
